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researchers have advocated service-oriented architecture (SOA) as a new computing paradigm for building IT systems [4, 39] . Service-oriented architecture refers to an architecture style that supports loosely-coupled interoperable services to enable business flexibility and agility [7] . It consists of a composite set of business-aligned services that support a flexible and dynamically reconfigurable, end-to-end business process realization using interface-based service descriptions [13] . 1 Prior research on SOA claimed several potential benefits and advantages [10, 35, 53] , including enhanced IS agility and improved IT-business alignment [5, 11, 12, 35] , and many organizations invested in SOA expecting to reap those potential benefits. A large-scale survey conducted in 2008 by Ross et al. found that the average SOA budget in 2007 was $4.9 million, while the SOA budgets of some firms were close to $11 million [47] . A Forrester report [20] revealed that 71% of the enterprises surveyed already were using SOA by the end of 2011.
However, other studies reported mixed outcomes after implementing SOA. For example, a study by Burton Group showed that 50% of the investigated 20 companies considered their SOA initiatives as a complete failure, whereas only 20% of them viewed their SOA initiatives successful [36] . In contrast, a survey from CA Technologies found that 92% of SOA initiatives met or exceeded the objectives of business units [32] .
To explain these mixed outcomes, recent relevant literature has focused on the critical success factors that affect SOA implementation. The underlying research often cites factors that might facilitate or impede an organization's ability to receive the intended benefits of SOA. For example, Luthria et al. identified six key factors that influence the organizational adoption of 6 SOA [29] . Boh and Yellin examined two organizational factors that were potentially critical to ensuring the success of SOA implementations: top management support, and centralization of IT decision making [6] . Lee et al. presented 20 factors based on their review of 34 SOA studies and 22 interviews [24] . Joachim et al. found that an effective IT governance mechanism was needed to achieve the benefits of SOA [19] .
With this study, we add to the literature on this topic and provide a new explanation for the mixed outcomes of SOA implementation by exploring how interactions between critical factors affect the dynamics of SOA implementation. In particular, we investigate how two key exogenous factors (the duration of top management's normative commitment, and the information delay of organizational learning of SOA knowledge) interact with other critical factors over time to affect the success or failure of SOA implementation.
In this study, we adopt the process perspective [33] and develop a system dynamics (SD) model that is built on Nelson Repenning's theory of capability traps [42, 44] , expanded to incorporate many specifics of SOA implementation. Using the SD model, we conduct simulations that examine the dynamics of SOA implementation in different scenarios. We also demonstrate the phenomenon of the "tipping point."
To achieve a successful SOA implementation, top management must continue their normative commitment for a duration long enough that the organization can perceive the benefits that in turn motivate internal organizational commitment to SOA. We show that under certain conditions, even a small reduction in the duration of normative commitment can dramatically reverse the outcome of SOA implementation from success to failure. The simulation analysis reveals that (1) the duration of normative commitment can play a more critical role than the strength of normative commitment for the success of SOA implementation, and (2) the minimum duration of normative commitment needed for a successful SOA implementation has a positive association with the information delay of organizational learning of SOA knowledge. Finally, we discuss how the dynamics of SOA implementation can result in some organizational traps as well as the structural and organizational causes of the traps.
Our study makes two important contributions to the IS literature. First, our study provides a new explanation, from the process perspective, for the mixed outcomes of SOA implementation.
Second, using simulation analysis based on the SD model, the study demonstrates the phenomenon of tipping point and the critical role of the duration of normative commitment.
Whereas prior research often discussed top management support in general [18] , our study is perhaps the first research that separates the duration and the strength of top management support, finding that duration plays a more critical role than strength for a successful SOA implementation. Also, it is important for IT managers to understand the positive association between the minimal duration of normative commitment for a successful SOA implementation and the information delay of organizational learning of SOA knowledge.
Research Methodology
In this section, we discuss two different research perspectives: variance and process. Then we describe our semi-structured interviews and how we develop the SD model in the study.
Research Perspectives: Variance versus Process
Mohr identifies two different perspectives of organizational research: variance and process [33] .
Variance research aims to explain variations in outcome variables by associating them with predictors and necessary and sufficient conditions; process research seeks to "explain outcomes by examining sequences of events over time" [45, p. 19] . To date, prior research on SOA largely 8 used the variance perspective and focused on either the potential benefits of SOA [10, 35, 53] or the critical success factors of SOA implementation [6, 19, 24, 29] . However, earlier research neglected to explore the complex interactions and timing dependencies between the critical factors.
Unlike prior research, we adopted the process perspective in this study, making use of SD modeling [51] as the main research methodology. SD modeling is a powerful tool for organizational research [44, 48, 49, 51] and has been widely used in IS research [9, 11, 12, 15, 41] . Compared to other organizational research methodologies, the strength of SD modeling lies in its exploration of feedback loops, timing delays, the nonlinearity associated with the process of organizational change [31, 38] , and its ability to generate insights into the dynamics of SOA implementation. An operationalized SD model enabled us to conduct rich simulation analyses and to examine the dynamics of SOA implementation in different scenarios.
Semi-Structured Interviews
We utilized semi-structured interviews and discussions with subject-matter experts, in combination with an extensive literature review, to build the SD model. The interview sample consisted of 10 North American organizations that have implemented, or are in the process of implementing, SOA. These include: EMC, Raytheon, Oracle, SAP, MIT Lincoln Lab, and several U.S. government agencies. While some of them only implemented SOA within their own organizations, others like Raytheon and MIT Lincoln Lab, implemented SOA not only in their own organizations but helped other organizations with their SOA implementation.
SD Model Development
We followed standard procedure for SD model development [1, 51] . Specifically, we took the following four steps:
• First, we conducted an initial series of 10 preliminary interviews with 14 IT managers and developers; some of the interviews were conducted as group discussions with multiple participants. Interviews lasted between 60 and 90 minutes. After the research purpose was explained, informants described their professional backgrounds. Then they were asked to share their experiences about SOA implementation and to suggest the key challenges and factors that facilitated or impeded their SOA implementation efforts. In this step, we focused on determining the interactions and timing dependencies between the various factors. To build more confidence in our findings and devise holistic and multifaceted explanations of the change [40] , follow-up conversations by telephone or email, an intensive documentation review, and direct on-site observations were also conducted. The result of this step was a preliminary SD model.
• Second, we conducted an extensive literature review after the preliminary SD model was built. The literature review covered prior research on organizational studies [33, 38, 45] , system dynamics [44, 48, 49, 51] , and information systems [1] , including SOA [11, 17, 35] and ERP [45] . The literature review filled in gaps in the preliminary model, leading to a more detailed and refined SD model. Each causal link in the model was justified by supportive evidence from our interviews or the literature review.
• Third, we conducted another set of 15 interviews with 22 interviewees. The interviewees included a range of subject-matter experts, including CIOs, mid-level IT managers, and IT developers. These interviews provided evidence that reflected the 10 perspectives of various organizational levels. Using the model generated from the previous steps as a starting point, the interviews and discussions in this step were more concentrated.
Further, various techniques for confirmation were used, such as follow-up conversations, intensive documentation review, and on-site observation. As is typical with qualitative research [27, 40] , we triangulated across multiple sources and proceeded iteratively between the interviews and building the SD model.
• Finally, we conducted a number of interviews after a simulation analysis was conducted based on the built SD model. The inputs from those interviews provided face validity of the SD model and enhanced our confidence in the interpretation of the simulation results.
Note that during the interviews and model development, some IT managers and developers spent two to four hours with us, going through every variable and causal link in the SD model and the simulation results. Their input and feedback enabled us to build the SD model largely grounded on their empirical experiences. By doing this, the face validity of the model was strengthened, especially because it was validated directly with the practitioners.
System Dynamics Model
The most important aspect of an SD model is its structure, which we built through interviews and the literature review. In this section, we briefly introduce the key feedback loops of the SD model as they apply to SOA implementation. Throughout this text, the names of variables are shown in italic font. Details of the model can be found in Appendix A. Key assumptions about the model and its operationalization are documented in Appendix B. We operationalize the SD model and present the equations, parameters, and table functions in the online appendix. and then completely removes it at the 14 th month. 4 By setting the learning time as 12, we examined a situation in which it took 12 months for the organization to accumulate sufficient knowledge and experience in the use of service-oriented systems to be fully effective. Note that the base scenario we examined was just one of the possible scenarios in which the SOA implementation was successful. In a simulation analysis, we can examine the dynamics of SOA implementation with different parameter settings. Figure 2 compares the simulation results of the base scenario with that of an alternative scenario, which we will explain in the next section. The curves numbered with "1" in Figure 2 are the simulation results from the base scenario. Figure 2 (a) shows that the organization's IS agility grows quickly from the beginning. When the normative commitment is removed at the enable the organization to perceive sufficient benefits from SOA. This is evident in Figure 2 (b), which shows the perceived benefits of SOA starting to rise quickly before the 14 th month, and internal commitment remains motivated to continue developing SOA. After normative commitment is removed, it is internal commitment that continues to drive the momentum of SOA implementation. shows that when the normative commitment is removed at the 14 th month, the total system delivery rate rises suddenly. But to implement SOA, the organization suffers from the classic "worse-before-better" phenomenon, and the system delivery rate drops during the 14 th to 18 th month. Only after the 18 th month does the system delivery rate stop dropping and begin to grow. Eventually, the system delivery rate stabilizes at a higher level.
The base scenario demonstrates that an organization that completely removes its normative commitment at the 14 th month can still succeed with its SOA implementation. The organization does suffer from a "worse-before-better" phenomenon during the SOA implementation process, which is consistent with the experiences of the experts we interviewed, thus validating the model's structural behavior. We use the base scenario as the benchmark in the simulation analysis. Figure 2(d) indicates that the system delivery rate jumps to a higher level when the normative commitment is removed at the 9 th month, but remains at that level, which is actually lower than the level eventually attained in the base scenario.
Interestingly, during the period between the 9 th and 37 th month, the system delivery rate in Simulation 1 is higher than that of the base scenarios, which reflects the "worse-before-better" pattern; that is, the organization suffers a "worse" period before it achieves the "better" level of system delivery rate.
Simulation 2: Longer Learning Time
Simulation 2 examines how the information delay affects the dynamics of SOA implementation.
In this simulation, we increase the learning time from 12 to 20 months, hold the duration of normative commitment at 14, and leave all other factors unchanged. This means that we examine a situation in which it takes 20 months for the organization to accumulate sufficient knowledge of using service-oriented systems to be fully effective. This may occur because (as in this case) the organization size is larger, or the SOA technical complexity is higher, or the organization does not have as effective training procedures as they have in the base scenario.
The lines numbered with "2" in Figure 3 show the results of Simulation 2 when comparing it to the base scenario (lines numbered with "1"). Like Simulation 1, the SOA implementation in Simulation 2 fails. The results suggest that if an organization has a longer learning time for acquiring SOA knowledge (longer time delay in the reinforcing loops R1, R2, and R3), the organization needs to continue its normative commitment longer in order to succeed with the SOA implementation. 
Figure 4(b). Duration vs. Strength of Normative Commitment: IS Agility

Tipping Point and Organizational Traps
Discovering the Tipping Point
In this simulation, we fix learning time as 12 months and examine how different durations of normative commitment affect the success or failure of SOA implementation. Figure 5 shows the different dynamics that occur when the duration of normative commitment is set at 14, 12, 10, or 9. When normative commitment continues for 10 months or longer, the organization's IS agility grows upward and stabilizes at a high level close to 1.0. But the organization fails to enhance its IS agility if normative commitment continues for 9 months or less. The striking finding is that a seemingly small difference in the duration of normative commitment can lead to the ultimate success or failure of SOA implementation.
IS Agility
Figure 5: Demonstration of "Tipping Point"
There appears to be a tipping point for normative commitment that lies between 9 and 10 months. As long as the organization continues its normative commitment for a period beyond the tipping point, IS agility will continue to increase. If normative commitment is discontinued before the tipping point, the entire SOA implementation fails. Figure 5 also shows that, beyond the tipping point, a longer duration of normative commitment allows IS agility to reach and stabilize at a high level faster.
It is important to understand that the precise tipping point depends on various parameters in the model, which vary from organization to organization. The representative values we used were suggested by the experts we interviewed. However, the existence of a tipping point (at whatever point it may occur) is intrinsically determined by the structure of the SOA implementation process, specifically, the two balancing loops (B1, B2) and three reinforcing loops (R1-R3).
As a result of this simulation, we learned that managers have to be patient and continue their normative commitment further beyond the tipping point because a seemingly small reduction in the duration of normative commitment can dramatically reverse the outcome of an SOA implementation from success to failure.
While Figure 5 demonstrates the existence of a tipping point, we note that it is difficult (if not impossible) to determine precisely where the tipping point will be because it depends on the parameters of the social dynamic systems. The technology learning trap refers to a situation in which the technology is perceived to be more difficult and complex because it is not well understood due to insufficient learning. A technology learning trap indicates the existence of a cycle of "learning-by-doing" [2] or, more specifically, "learning-by-using" [46] . Consequently, developers continue to under-invest in SOA, and to believe that the SOA technology is complex, so their response is to postpone the learning process even further.
The implementation effectiveness trap refers to a situation in which SOA is believed to be inappropriate if an SOA implementation is temporarily less effective and/or the expected benefits of SOA are delayed. Such misperceptions may lead the organization to conclude that SOA is inappropriate in the current organizational context, instead of understanding that the temporary ineffectiveness is due to insufficient SOA penetration in the organization. As a result, the reinforcing loop continues, with developers still under-investing in SOA, and delivering IT systems that are not service-oriented. These actions further undermine the effectiveness of SOA.
Further, the two organizational traps are different but intertwined with each other. Because the top management team may change [23] or their strategic attention (and resources) fade away, both traps result in the failure of SOA implementation efforts.
These two organizational traps emerged as a result of our simulations and during the course of our interviews. For example, the chief scientist in a large software vendor complained about the complexity of SOA technologies:
I think the technologies of SOA are very complex and hard to understand. . . . There are so many dependencies among the parts of different services. . . . We used to develop a SOA system. But when we demonstrated it, it failed to work! Because the dependencies are so complex and there is little documentation, we could not find the problems. . . . The contexts of using SOA are also too complex . . .so many configurations . . . When asked how much time and training the organization had invested in learning SOA, the chief scientist explained that they did not have sufficient experts to train their IT developers, which indicates insufficient learning about SOA technology. By contrast, interviewees who had good experiences with their SOA implementation efforts did not complain about the complexity of SOA technologies and often made favorable comments about SOA's effectiveness .
Causes of Organizational Traps
We found several plausible causes that may contribute to creating organizational traps.
First, there is a fundamental tension in the tradeoff between short-term performance drop and potential long-term benefits. The problem is indicated by the occurrence of the "worse-beforebetter" pattern [42] , which we demonstrated in our simulations. As Hau et al. note, one of the primary challenges of SOA implementation lies in that many firms failed to realize the benefits of SOA because they suffered from the inherent tradeoff between long-term benefits versus short-term local needs [17] . Moreover, short-term performance drop and potential long-term benefits are often associated with different groups of organizational actors [18] .
Investing resources (e.g., time and budget) in SOA disrupts the organization's normal operation [25] . Developers need to devote a substantial portion of their work hours to SOA implementation, which decreases their responsiveness to requests for IT functionalities in the early stage of the implementation process. In short, to improve IS agility, the organization must be willing to sacrifice expected performance for the short term. System delivery rate is a more salient and immediate performance indicator, and the urgency of IT functionality requests often emphasize this salience. In comparison, IS agility is an organization-level, less-salient, and lessimmediate performance indicator when uncertainty due to the substantial anticipated delay before IS agility becomes apparent. Because of this cognitive and perceptual bias, people tend to overemphasize salient factors when processing attributions [52] , and organizational actors are likely to overweight delivery rate gap and ignore improving IS agility.
In some circumstances, sacrificing the long-term benefits of SOA seems inevitable. The CIO of a large energy company explained this dilemma:
Firms will likely scale back on SOA investment due to economic conditions, sacrificing long-term benefit for short-term gains. As the short-term view is focused on survival, this is the right change of focus. This will result in higher overall SOA costs as investments to date will either become stranded, or written off. At some future point, when such projects resume, technology and staff will have changed, not permitting continuity from where things were left. Time to realize benefits will be extended due to both total cost and total time to implement. Second, SOA, as a complex architectural style, manifests the agency of organizational actors (e.g., IT managers and developers) to control their interactions with the SOA technology and its characteristics. Organizational actors have considerable flexibility in design, implementation, use, and interpretation of service-oriented systems, which indicates interpretive flexibility of technological artifacts [37] . Many interviewees noted that there were different ways to deliver the same system functionality when they decided on specific implementation strategies.
Interpretive flexibility allows the SOA technology to be appropriated in diverse ways by actors in different organizations or by the same actors in different contexts [30] . It is possible that organizational actors may inappropriately implement or use SOA and misinterpret its effectiveness. An IT manager from a large software vendor commented on the challenge of handling the interpretive flexibility of SOA implementation:
It is difficult to monitor along the way whether the developers actually use the SOA standards and methodology to build the systems. So I think QA [quality assurance] is important. But even if there is a QA process, it usually comes in at the end of the project. Enforcement of compliance to SOA standards and methodology is challenging. Finally, while Figure 5 demonstrates the existence of a tipping point associated with SOA implementation, it is often difficult to predict precisely where the tipping point will occur.
Within the parameters of our simulation model, Figure 5 shows the minimal duration of normative commitment for a successful SOA implementation. However, when the implementation is underway, it is difficult, if not impossible, for top management to know ahead of time the precise duration of normative commitment needed so that the entire SOA implementation will succeed. Consequently, impatient managers are likely to shorten the duration of normative commitment before the SOA implementation reaches or exceeds the tipping point. Managers may think the strength of normative commitment could be a substitute for the duration of normative commitment. However, the results from Simulation 3 show that such a substitution does not work. Duration of normative commitment plays a unique and critical role in the success of SOA implementation-far more than strength.
Conclusion
Our findings generate important research implications. Earlier IS literature indicates that human agency often plays an important role in IS implementation, for example, in ERP implementation [37, 54] . In the IS literature on ERP, Grant et al. write: "[K]ey stakeholders in the ERP implementation process adopted different discourses" and highlighted the role of their discourses in the social shaping of ERP implementation [16, p. 13] . Scott et al. point out that the success or failure of an ERP implementation is actually highly situated and relates to the negotiations between actor networks surrounding the implementation process [50] . Although ERP as a monolithic IS architecture is distinct from SOA, prior research on ERP inspires us to accommodate human agency in this study and to examine the important role that human agency plays during an SOA implementation, for example, how long top management would continue its normative commitment for SOA.
Next, our study suggests that the technology learning trap and implementation effectiveness trap result from not only the characteristics of the technology (in this case, SOA) and the inherent structure of the implementation process (i.e., the reinforcing feedback loops), but also from the dynamic interactions between human agency and the technology implementation process. The misattribution by organizational actors when they become stuck in the traps reflects another form of self-confirming error; yet it is different from that discussed in Repenning's works on process improvement in manufacturing [44] .
Finally, SOA implementation requires organizations to invest substantial resources upfront before benefits are recognized by organizational actors-a phenomenon known as "worsebefore-better" [42] . During the "worse" period, different organizational actors make judgments, from their own perspectives, about what becomes "worse" to them, how "worse" it will be, and how long the "worse" will continue. Impatient organizational actors are likely to under-invest in SOA implementation, thus causing the entire project to become stuck in the technology learning and implementation effectiveness traps. Once stuck, it is difficult for the organizational actors to correctly recognize and attribute the vicious cycle of the dynamics of the implementation process. Due to that misattribution, subsequent reactions of organizational actors further exacerbate the vicious cycle. Our findings from this study suggest IT managers take a long-term, global view about their SOA implementation projects. IT managers need understand the potential organizational traps and prepare appropriate strategies to deal with the challenges. For example, if the organizational size is larger or the organiztion does not have sufficient SOA expertise, IT managers need to anticipate the time delay before the benefits of SOA implementation are realized would be longer and therefore have to continue normative commitment for a longer period of time, rather than devoting stronger normative commitment in a short period. Thus, by understanding these causes of organizational traps, IT managers can make better decisions about their implementation projects.
Appendix A. Details of the System Dynamics Model
The first key variable in the model is Proportion of Service-Oriented Systems, which is the ratio of the number of Service-Oriented Systems over the number of total Installed IT Systems. This variable captures SOA penetration, which reflects the fact that only a proportion of delivered IT systems are service-oriented systems. Because IT developers need spend extra time to follow SOA design principles [21, 35] for building service-oriented systems, they may not be able to comply with SOA in the implementation of all IT systems, especially when they face schedule pressure and limited resources.
Delivering IT systems that are not service-oriented is tolerable in many organizations that we interviewed. The delivered IT systems are installed with System Delivery Rate. Service-Oriented System Delivery Rate is a fraction of System Delivery Rate. The fraction coefficient depends on the fraction of working hours spent on implementing SOA. In the following we introduce the key feedback loops.
(1) Balancing Loop B1
We begin with Proportion of Service-Oriented Systems in Figure A1 (the starting variable in a feedback loop is indicated with a triangle for readers' convenience). A higher Proportion of Service-Oriented Systems enhances the organization's IS Agility [11] . IS Agility Gap, defined as the difference between Desired IS Agility and actual IS Agility, results in Pressure to Implement SOA. Management Commitment is required to generate Pressure to Implement SOA, reflecting the fact that Management Commitment is a critical success factor of SOA implementation [6, 24] . While IT developers face Pressure to Implement SOA, they also have Pressure to Deliver on We begin with System Delivery Rate in Figure A2 . The IT department has its System Delivery Rate, which is determined by Developer Headcount, a developer's average Development Productivity, and how much time developers need to spend on functional requirements. Development Productivity refers to on average how many IT systems 5 a developer can deliver within one unit of time (e.g., one month) when the developer spends all of his work 5 For measurement consideration, a developer's development productivity can be measured as the unit of software components, modules, or functional features. Service-oriented systems developed through the use of SOA design principles are more reusable, interoperable, and easier to integrate with other IT systems [11, 35] . Therefore, it is relatively easier for IT developers to make use of existing reusable service-oriented systems (e.g., components or services) when they develop new IT systems and integrate them with existing service-oriented systems. Accordingly, SOA implementation increases Development Productivity of the IT developers on average [11, 17, 35] .
In Figure A3 we begin with Effectiveness of SOA, which represents the extent to which the developers' Development Productivity is increased compared to Base Development Productivity.
When more service-oriented systems are installed in the organization (Proportion of ServiceOriented Systems is higher), SOA becomes more effective and the average Development We use the first-order information delay [51] We begin with Effectiveness of SOA in Figure A5 . The positive relationship between the effectiveness of innovative IT (particularly the effectiveness of SOA) and the perceived benefits has been discussed in some detail by Mueller et al. [35] . Choi et al. [11] also point out that SOA implementation effectiveness is an important determinant of the perceived benefits and value derived from SOA. Greater perceived benefits of SOA create favorable word of mouth in the organization [51] and generate additional internal commitment to SOA implementation. The causal link between results of the technology in use and the generation of commitment is also supported by motivation and organizational theories [43, 55] . Commitment generated by the perceived benefits of SOA is considered internal and endogenous, reflecting the additional commitment (Commitment from Perceived Benefits) resulting from the use of service-oriented systems.
Besides endogenous commitment, exogenous sources of commitment also contribute to motivating an organization's SOA implementation. Those exogenous sources often come from top management, and we call them Normative Commitment. Institutional theory suggests that coercive, mimetic, and normative pressures are important factors affecting innovation adoption [14] . Liang et al. [26] also support the theory that institutional pressures have a positive effect on [22] . Based on our interviews, the strategic attention of top management may shift because of changes in the top management team or because of a technology fad. Accordingly, the duration of Normative Commitment becomes an important factor in SOA implementation. 
Appendix B. Model Assumptions and Validation
The SD model is validated in two ways. On one hand, we validated the simulation results from the model using input and feedback from the subject-matter experts we interviewed. For example, in the scenario of a successful SOA implementation (like the base scenario shown in This is done because the qualitative evidence from our interviews shows that Fraction of Time Spent on Functional REQ increases with the ratio, but its rate of change diminishes as the ratio approaches to 0 or infinity. An S-shaped function can capture this nonlinear relationship. We used different S-shaped functions and the results were qualitatively similar. Thus, the model is robust regarding the selection of different S-shaped functions. This was validated by our interviews with experts and by the literature [11, 21] . In most cases, the first priority of IT developers was to deliver IT functionalities for business users. Many organizations we interviewed confirmed that they allowed IT developers to implement IT systems that were not service-oriented if timely delivery of the IT functionalities was important to business users.
Fraction of Time Spent on
Functional REQ is an S-shaped function of the ratio of Pressure to Deliver on Schedule over Pressure to Implement SOA.
The qualitative evidence from our interviews showed that Fraction of Time Spent on Functional REQ increased with the ratio, but its rate of change diminished as the ratio approached 0 or infinity. An S-shaped function can capture this nonlinear relationship. We conducted sensitivity analysis and used different S-shaped functions, and the results were qualitatively similar. Thus, the model is robust to the selection of different S-shaped functions.
3. Top management can only continue Normative Commitment for a certain period of time.
This was validated by our interviews and the literature [22] . For example, experts provided multiple reasons why top management's normative commitment could not continue forever: (i) the management team may change, (ii) the strategic attention or organizational resources may shift over time due to some crisis, and (iii) technology fads shift over time.
4. In the base scenario, top management completely removes normative commitment at a certain time point, and a STEP function is used to model this.
This simplified assumption is realistic in some cases but may not fully capture reality in other cases. Nevertheless, it does not compromise key model insights.
As a robustness check, we used an alternative assumption that top management reduces normative commitment gradually (e.g., using RAMP function) and found the results are qualitatively similar. Simulation 3 shows a case in which normative commitment decreases at a constant rate using a RAMP function.
5. In the base scenario, it takes 12 months for the organization to accumulate sufficient knowledge and experience of using serviceoriented systems to be fully effective.
Qualitative evidence from our interviews suggested that many organizations spent 6 months to 2 years (or longer) learning to use SOA effectively. The base scenario is one in which time delay is set to 12 months, and the SOA implementation succeeded. Time delay is different, depending on organizational characteristics (e.g., organizational size) and SOA technology complexity. The simulation analysis examines how the dynamics of SOA implementation change with different values of the time delay.
6. In the base scenario, top management continues its normative commitment for 14 months.
Qualitative evidence from our interviews suggested that top management advocated SOA for 6 months to 2 years. The base scenario is one in which top management advocates SOA and the normative commitment continues for 14 months. The simulation analysis examined how the dynamics of SOA implementation changed with different duration values. Figure 5 shows different scenarios of successful SOA implementation when the duration is set to be 10, 12, and 14 months. The dynamics resulting from longer durations are qualitatively similar.
7. When using STEP function to model normative commitment, the strength of normative commitment is set to 0.8 before the duration is reached.
0.8 means the strength of normative commitment counts for 80% of the maximum strength of the commitment the organization could give to SOA. Strength is not critical because in most simulations, when we used STEP function to model normative commitment, the magnitude was set as a constant 0.8 before duration ends. Keeping the magnitude constant, our study focused on duration of normative commitment. In the sensitivity analysis we used other values as the constant (e.g., 0.9 or 1.0) and the results were qualitatively similar.
In addition, we also used RAMP function to model normative commitment by assuming that strength decreases gradually over time. The simulation results are also similar, suggesting that magnitude is not critical.
